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I.  INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
1.  Ambassador  Hermes  and  I  have decided on  a 
policy of  "division of  labor"  for this 
morning's presentation. 
as  a  representative of the European 
Community -- the  Common  Market -- as 
it is often referred to,  I  will address 
some  of the major  economic  issues which 
loom large in the transatlantic relations. 
Ambassador  Hermes,  as  you will see,  will 
concentrate his remarks  on  those 
"juicy"  issues of East-West relations 
and  the  gas pipeline. 
2.  I  am  sure that it comes  as  no  news  to you 
that the alliance is in the midst of  a 
series of economic,  political and 
military squabbles  which,  if not toned 
down  and  resolved,  could  lead to some 
unwelcome  consequences  on both sides of 
the Atlantic. --------------------------------------------------
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II.  THE  WORLD  ECONOMIC  CRISIS 
1.  We  are facing  in the  1980s  a  world 
economic crisis of staggering proportions 
This worldwide  phenomenon -- from which 
no  one  seems  immune  -- is affecting our 
relations in a  negative way. 
2.  The  depth of the crisis cannot be overstated 
Unemployment  in the countries of the E.C. 
(Jan.  1982)  is  10.8 million or  9.5% 
of the total civilian work  force. 
In the U.S.,  9.2 million are unemployed 
as of January  1982  (8.5%  of the civilian 
work  force. 
In the  OECD  nations,  real GNP  growth was 
1.3%  in  1980  and  1.3%  in  1981.  The  U.S. 
GNP  grew by  1.9%  in  1981  while the  EC 
declined by  0.8%. 
Interest rates remain high  and stiffle 
economic  recovery on both  sides of  the 
Atlantic 
Inflation is coming  down  in  some  countries 
but only  as  a  result of  a  prolonged 
recession  (1981:  10.4%  in u.s. 
12.7%  in E.C.) 
3.  The  continuing crisis creates a  sense of 
gloom  and  pessimism. 
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4.  Protectionism of domestic  economies is 
a  pressure that is resisted with great 
difficulty when  severe  economic  conditions 
prevail. 
Protectionism is an evil which must  be 
resisted in these troubled times. 
Prosperity  depends  on  as  free  an 
international trading  system as possible l 
-
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III.  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
The  European  Community  - which  now  consists 
of ten member-states  - is first and 
foremost  a  trading bloc. 
Europe  - more  than America  - is a  highly 
trade-dependent continent. 
The  European nations have  always  been 
trading nations  and their dependence  on 
trade is not new 
The  development  of our cultures and  social 
systems would  not have  been possible 
without extensive and diverse commercial 
exchanges  amongst ourselves  and with the 
rest of the world 
Imports  and  exports  from  and  to third 
countries  (extra-EC trade)  constituted over 
20%  (36%  including intra-E.C.  trade)  of the 
E.C.'s Gross  National Product  (12%  for  U.S.) 
The  E.C.  has  a  35%  share of world exports 
The  E.C.  currently takes  25%  of total 
exports  from  the developing countries 
(  21 • 5%  for  U.S. ) 
European  imports of manufactures  from  the 
developing countries  (as  a  percentage of  GNP) 
are  24%  larger than those of the u.s. 
The  Community  imports  90%  of its raw 
materials  (55%  of primary energy needs) s. 
The  European  Community  - whose  development 
was  supported  and even nurtured by 
successive U.S.  administrations  - has 
become  the world's largest single trading 
bloc  and  a  powerful  competitor for  the 
United States 
-
•  The  U.S.  and  the E.C.,  at the  same  time, 
are each other's major  customer 
•  The  U.S.  maintained  about  a  $10  billion 
trade surplus with the E.C.  in  1981 
($20  billion in  1980) 
Its developments  has  been based primarily 
on the principle of the liberalization of 
trade  - transatlantic and  worldwide . 
•  The  E.C.  and its executive body,  the 
Commission,  by  coordinating the trade 
policies of  sovereign nations,  have 
acquired primary responsibility for 
carrying out European  trade policies and 
negotiating international trade agree-
ments  and  reducing barriers to trade 
within the context of  GATT 
•  The  E.C.  has  been responsible for 
defusing mounting protectionist pressures 
in Europe,  from  the  chemical  and textile 
industries for  example 
•  In recent months,  our objectives  vis-a-vis 
the United States has  been to avert a 
trade war erupting over growing dis-
agreement with our American allies on 
agricultural and  industrial goods. 
Europe  needs  trade to survive  and 
recover  economically .  . 
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IV.  TRANSATLANTIC  TRADING  FRICTIONS 
In recent months,  officials from  both sides 
of the Atlantic have  engaged in continuing 
discussions  on  a  range of trade issues - some 
of which  I  would  like to outline this 
afternoon. 
1.  Agricultural trade 
There has  been  a  marked deterioration in 
relations  between the u.s.  and  the E.C. 
in the agricultural sector  • 
Recent meetings  in Washington  in early 
February between  E.C.  Commissioners  and 
U.S.  Cabinet officials made  that 
painfully evident  • 
•  pressures in the  U.S.  Congress  are 
growing 
•  there  seems  to be  a  feeling here 
that American  farmers  could  remedy 
their problems  (lowest  farm  income 
in  40  years)  by  challenging European 
farm policies 
•  what is unclear is the extent to which 
the American  farmer  himself ascribes 
his troubles  to European policies. 
1 
what is certain,  however,  is that 
current u.s.  government officials, 
consumated,  it seems,  by  a  great desire 
to export,  are  "escalating" agricul-
tural disputes. .  . 
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our differences in this area revolve 
around  E.C.  policies on agricultural 
exports  and  on  the application of 
the Subsidy Code 
•  formal  complaints against the E.C •. 
have been initiated by u.s.  producers of 
poultry,  pasta,  wheat flour,  sugar, 
preserved fruit and citrus. 
We,  Europeansl-believe that we  have  abided 
by the rules of GATT  negotiated in the 
multilateral trade negotiations,  and 
which allow subsidies as  long as  they do 
not entail the acquisition of more  than 
equitable market  share in third markets 
•  the volume of our exports has  expanded 
in recent years because world  demand 
has risen (for both u.s.  and  E.C.) 
•  in many  sectors  (wheat,  poultry)  the 
u.s.  has  taken  a  larger share of the 
expansion than the E.C.  Such sectors 
include wheat  and poultry,  where  the 
u.s.  has filed Trade  Act  complaints 
(Section  301) 
•  using the  same  base years,  E.C. 
agricultural exports,  as  a  percentage 
of world agricultural trade,  have risen 
from  10%  to  11.4%  between  1971  and  1980 
while  the u.s.  share went  from  14%  to 
17%  in the  same  period  (USDA  claims 
of E.C.  increase from  9.3%  to  11.4% 
is from  1979  to  1980) ·I 
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finally,  over the past decade,  the 
United States has  maintained  a 
growing agricultural trade surplus 
with the E.C.  (from  $1.4 billion in 
1971  to over  $7  billion in  1980 and 81) 
There is a  great concern in Europe  regardin~ 
the possible intention on the part of the 
u.s.  trade and agricultural officials to 
seek  a  renegotiation of GATT  rules on 
agriculture, ·should the  U.S.  complaints 
not  go their way. 
Such  an eventuality would  leave the door 
open  for retaliatory and protectionist 
measures  in Europe,  where  the  farmer is 
also experiencing a  severe decline in his 
level of  income.  (The  CAP  pricing 
proposals  for  1982  were  less than the 
inflation level) 
The  CAP  remains  remains  a  critical cog  in 
the process of European  integration and 
cannot be  abandoned.  We  have  been  taking 
steps,  however,  to reform the  CAP,  by 
diminishing incentives  for  surplus 
productions  and  reducing the  amounts  of 
transfer payments  to European  farmers,  not 
an easy task in times of depressed  farm 
prices and  incomes  in Europe • 
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2.  Steel 
Another area of irritation concerns 
European steel exports to the United States 
Petitions under  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing duty statutes have  been 
filed by the American steel industry 
against producers in seven member-states 
of the European  Community.  This  has created 
a  powder  keg which must  be defused. 
The  U.S.  s~eel producers claim that 
European countries are  subsidizing their 
steel exports.  Our  view is that the steel 
industry's difficulties are to be  ascribed 
to the worsening of the U.S.  economic 
situation which,  in particular,  led to a 
spectacular drop in the  demand  for steel 
on the American market. 
The  35%  rise in the value of  the dollar 
against major  European currencies made  steel 
imports very attractive on the u.s.  market 
where  prices are still much  higher than 
in the E.C.  or Japan. 
The  filing of these cases will create a 
high degree of uncertainty among  European 
steel producers,  who  will hesitate to 
export,  thus creating more difficulties 
in a  seriously troubled industry in Europe 
These  complaints filed by  the U.S.  steel 
industry constitute a  form of harassment 
to us. 
we  are distressed that the American 
Administration was  not strong enough  to 
stand up to domestic pressure -- by 
rejecting so  few  cases to be  filed with 
the  ITC  -- the way  the  Community did 
~· 
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against European  petroleum chemical 
and  synthetic fibre manufacturers 
in  1980  when  the latter were  asking 
for  ·.action against u.s. 
imports. 
some  of the cases were  filed against 
steel producers which exported very 
small -- or even no -- quantities of 
steel products to the u.s. 
(example:  cases were  filed against 
France for cold-rolled carbon strip, 
which  was  not  imported in the u.s.  in 
1981,  and against Belgium and  Luxem-
bourg  for exporting  60  tons of hot-
rolled carbon strip -- 0.01%  of u.s. 
market). 
•  the fact that the  ITC  recently 
rejected over half of the industry's 
complaints  leads credence to the 
European position and illustrates the 
weakness of u.s.  officials in resisting 
industry pressures.  · 
3.  Resistance to protectionism 
Economic  dislocation,  persistent 
recession and uncertainty about the 
future  make  people more  inward-looking 
The  political will and  courage of 
governments  coupled with the recollection 
of the consequences of beggar-thy-
neighbor policies in the  1920s  and  1930s 
are the only ramparts  - it seems  -
against economic  warfare  and ultimately 
destruction of the international trading 
system all of us believe in and wish to 
preserve. 
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4.  Interest rates 
Just a  word  about  a  recent - but not new  -
transatlantic economic  problem 
High  U.S.  interest rates have  become,  . 
once  again,  a  cause of concern for  European 
governments  and  financial officials 
The  interdependence of our economies  and 
monetary  systems here  made  the projected 
u.s.  budget deficits and  high interest 
rates a  matter of concern in Europe. 
High  US  interest rates make  it difficult 
for  European countries to reduce  their own 
interest rates,  thereby stiffling economic 
recovery and  growth 
Failure to achieve  some  measure  of 
economic  growth can only add  fuel  to 
protectionist demands 12. 
V.  EAST-WEST  RELATIONS 
Ambassador  Hermes will,  as  I  said,  expound 
on  the various aspects of  East-West 
relations. 
I  would  merely wish to remind  you  of what 
steps the member-states have  taken  as  a 
community  to deal with the crisis in Poland 
While  Europeans  may  have  some  ambivalence 
about the use of sanctions to influence 
policy on  the part of an  adversary,  we 
recognize both their practical and 
symbolic effects in certain instances. 
Our  means  may  be different,  but our 
objectives are similar 
The  E.C.  Council of Ministers and the 
Commission  have: 
•  pledged that they would not undermine 
sanctions  imposed  by  the u.s.  against 
the Soviet Union 
taken steps to  impose  certain economic 
measures  against Poland  such as  the 
cancellation of subsidized food  sales 
raised the costs of export credits 
charged  the Soviet Union 
Moreover,  the Council  and the Commission 
are undertaking measures that would  raise 
the price for egregious Soviet behavior by 
reducing the availability of hard currency, 
something it badly needs,  especially to 
buy agricultural commodities. 
•. .• 
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. •  The  E.C.  will reduce  imports  from 
the Soviet Union  by  50%  (relative to 
1980)  on  a  wide  range of categories 
(raw materials to luxury  goods)  .. 
Another measure that might  be  considered 
would  be to raise  the price of grain 
sold to the Soviet Union.  This would  have 
the effect of preserving wheat producers' 
incomes while at the  same  time placing 
additional demands  on Soviet foreign 
exchange holdings 
Such measures would  genuinely  impact upon 
the Soviets and be  less costly to the 
. allies 
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VI~CHALLENGES FOR  THE  FUTURE 
I  would  have  liked to leave you with an 
upbeat assessment of our relationship 
•  I  am  not sure  I  can do  so 
My  feeling  is that things will get worse 
before they get better 
over the  long run,  our  common  interests 
and  shared heritage will help us  surmount 
whatever  problems  come  between us. 
The  subject of this session asked  the 
question whether Western Europe's foreign 
economic  policy was  compatible with u.s. 
basic interests 
after listening to both of us  tonight, 
you may  not be  sure what  the -- or our 
answer is 
•  if these  interests are the maintenance 
of  an  open world economic  system, 
political stability in the Western world, 
and  an  international order where  oppor-
tunities for destabilization by outside 
subversive  forces  are limited,  then  I  can 
safely say that U.S.  and  European 
interests are compatible with one  another 
•  at the  same  time,  however,  it is quite 
clear that we  have  disagreements  on how 
to carry out our foreign economic  policies ( 
...  / 
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- reconciling the  needs  of particular 
domestic  industrial and agricultural 
sectors is not an easy thing to do  for 
the u.s.  Government or European 
governments  --
- international bilateral exchanges  and 
consultations are the means  by which 
we  can attempt to resolve  some  of 
these problems 
It is indispensable to surmount 
momentary  disagreements to achieve what 
are essentially common  objectives 
•  Keeping  an unprejudiced eye  on what 
our ultimate,  compatible,  interests 
is  maybe  the only way  in which  we 
can weather these latest altercations 
in U.S.-European relations. 
Ambassador  Hermes will now  describe 
those aspects of the U.S.-European 
relationship which provide both the 
foundation  for its survival  and  the basis 
of its seemingly continuous  tensions. 
Once  you  have  listened to what  he  has 
to say,  we  look  forward  to what-you have 
to say in your questions  and  comments 